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Abstract: 
Generally, information provision and certification have been identified as the major economic 
functions of rating agencies. This paper analyzes whether the “watchlist" (rating review) 
instrument has extended the agencies' role towards a monitoring position, as proposed by 
Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006). Using a data set of Moody's rating history between 
1982 and 2004, we find that the overall information content of rating action has indeed 
increased since the introduction of the watchlist procedure. Our findings suggest that rating 
reviews help to establish implicit monitoring contracts between agencies and borrowers and 
as such enable a finer partition of rating information, thereby contributing to a higher 
information quality. 
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Credit rating agencies (CRAs) such as Standard and Poor's (S&P), Moody's Investors
Service or Fitch, Inc., provide opinions on the creditworthiness of entities and their ¯-
nancial obligations. While the speci¯c meaning of a credit rating varies slightly within
the agencies,1 ratings generally o®er quality assessments on a debt issuer or a speci¯c
debt obligation. Recent years have seen an expanding use of credit ratings, mostly due to
the globalization of ¯nancial markets, the growing complexity of ¯nancial products and,
generally, an increasing usage of ratings in ¯nancial regulation and contracting (Frost,
2006).
Additional to the widespread use of credit ratings is the complexity of rating infor-
mation itself. Most credit rating agencies do not only o®er a simple rating for a company
issuing securities and for the individual ¯nancial products issued, but complement their
service by o®ering additional information via rating outlooks and rating reviews (\watch-
lists").2 The proportion of ratings on watch, e.g., has strongly risen in recent years. While
until 1998 on average about 10% of bond issuers were under review at Moody's, this per-
centage has increased to more than 50% between 2000 and 2004 (Hamilton and Cantor,
2004). Obviously, the additional rating instruments have grown into heavily used tools for
rating agencies to transmit information to ¯nancial markets.
While it has generally been argued that rating agencies mainly provide information
to market participants, thereby ful¯lling a certi¯cation role, their function of facilitating
¯nancial contracting and regulation has also been recognized. In a recent study, Boot,
Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) have additionally pointed out the agencies' monitoring
role, that, via an implicit contract between agency and corporate borrower, endogenously
in°uences the company's credit quality and allows ratings to be even \more informative".
1Moody's ratings are \opinions about expected credit loss, which is composed of a default probability
component and a default severity component" (Hamilton and Cantor, 2004). S&P ratings, in contrast,
refer to relative default probabilities.
2Moody`s report ratings currently under review on their \Watchlist". S&P refer to the \CreditWatch".
In the following, we use the notions of rating watchlists and rating reviews interchangeably.
1Particularly against this background, the question why rating agencies introduced addi-
tional information services such as rating watchlists and outlooks remains unresolved. In
this paper we intend to scrutinize these additional services, taking rating reviews as an
example. Additionally to describing the watchlist as a relatively recent rating instrument,
we analyze its in°uence on ¯nancial markets and, hence, on the rated entities themselves,
in order to hint at its economic role.
As potential reasons for the implementation of rating reviews, two arguments are par-
ticularly compelling. First, agency ratings typically adjust more slowly to new information
than market-based measures of coporate default risk such as, e.g., KMV's distance-to-
default measure (LÄ o²er, 2004a; Vassalou and Xing, 2005; Robbe and Mahieu, 2005).3
However, while market prices respond prior to rating events, they tend to react by more
than is warranted ex-post. Agency ratings, in contrast, are supposed to re°ect changes in
credit quality only when they are \unlikely to be reversed within a relatively short period
of time" (Cantor, 2001).4 Watchlists may thus have helped the agencies to alleviate the
traditional con°ict between rating timeliness and accuracy. By creating an additional,
more lengthy rating process, agencies e®ectively \buy time" for assessing the entities at
question and are hence able to demonstrate timely action without compromising the long-
term character of their rating assessments (Altman and Rijken, 2005). The introduction
of a formal rating review process may therefore have been the agency's reaction to a
heightened demand of timely credit risk information from ¯nancial markets.
Second, by putting a rating on watch, rating agencies may also try to in°uence the
entity's future credit quality. Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) argue that speci¯c mar-
ket structures allow credit ratings to coordinate investor behavior. Institutional investors,
for instance, are forced by regulatory reasons to invest large parts of their portfolios only
in \investment-grade" rated debt instruments. Watchlist procedures, that imply rating
3Interestingly, the KMV measure of credit risk was introduced in 1989, i.e. only shortly before Moody's
released its institutionalized watchlist.
4LÄ o²er (2005) provides empirical proof of agency-ratings' stability and analyzes why rating reversals
may be harmful. LÄ o²er (2004b) examines the tradeo® between rating timeliness and accuracy against
the background of portfolio governance rules.
2changes with subsequent regulatory-forced investor action, hence strengthen the monitor-
ing role that credit rating agencies may play and lead to an implicit contract between
agency and borrower. Rating watchlists with designation downgrade, in particular, may
induce ¯rms to \undertake speci¯c actions to mitigate the possible deterioration of its
credit standing" (Boot et al., 2006). In February 2006, for instance, S&P placed E.ON's
debt on credit watch with negative implications. In August 2006, S&P commented: \Given
the perceived incremental weakening of E.ONs business position, we now expect that a ra-
tio of FFO to adjusted net debt of above 20% would be required to maintain an A-category
long-term credit rating ." (emphasis added)
According to these arguments, rating reviews provide agencies with the opportunity
to ful¯ll their traditional role as an information provider in a more complex way. As
such, it stands to reason whether rating watchlists improve the informational content of
the rating process. In a ¯rst step, we hence test - on the complete history of Moody's
estimated senior unsecured ratings between 1982 and 2004 - for a time-series break in
companies' cumulative abnormal stock returns following rating announcements, due to
the institutional implementation of the watchlist on October 1, 1991. Comparing the pre-
watchlist period (Apr 26, 1982 - Sep 1991) with the post-watchlist period (Oct 1991 -
Dec 2004) and focussing on rating downgrades, we ¯nd that the informational content
of ratings - measured by cumulative abnormal returns - has signi¯cantly increased. This
result continues to hold even when we control for additional explanatory factors such as
business-cycle or sample-composition e®ects and, consequently, underlines the relevance
of the institutional change implicit in the watchlist procedure. In a second step, we ask
which factors in°uence an agency's decision to put an issuer under review. We ¯nd that
management quality and ¯nancial °exibility seem to be the main criteria for watchlist
addition versus direct rating change. Controlling for these selecting factors, we show that
within the watchlist period, i.e. post-1991, the informational content of direct downgrades
is much stronger than that of review-preceded downgrades. This ¯nding supports the
\implicit contracting" hypothesis according to which rating agencies actively monitor the
rated entity's willingness to repay debt via the watchlist procedure, while direct rating
3action informs on the issuer's capability to do so. Various robustness tests come to the
same conclusion.
While, in line with earlier studies, we hardly ¯nd any signi¯cant market reaction to
upgrades, interesting additional ¯ndings can be derived for downgrades. For instance, a
downgrade from investment-grade to junk-bond status triggers a negative market reac-
tion only after the introduction of the watchlist. Before 1991, however, crossing of the
investment-grade boundary led to a positive market reaction. Likewise, the more time
elapsed since the last rating change, the more positive is the market reaction to a rat-
ing downgrade post-1991, while the e®ect is negative prior to the watchlist introduction.
These slightly counterintuitive results complement the ¯ndings by Hill and Fa® (2007)
that downgrades (upgrades) that are preceded by a credit watch lead to positive (neg-
ative) market returns. Taken together, they hint at the special role that rating reviews
seem to play.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview on related
studies on market reactions to rating changes and, particularly, on watchlist e®ects. Sec-
tion 3 contains a brief description of the watchlist procedure and presents the hypotheses
to be tested in sections 5 - 7. Section 4 describes our data set and lays out its main char-
acteristics, while sections 5, 6 and 7 contain both univariate and multivariate analyses.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Several studies have recently examined the e®ect of rating changes on market returns.
With respect to stock market returns, negative e®ects are usually reported for down-
grades while signi¯cant returns are rarely found for upgrades (Cantor, 2004; Vassalou and
Xing, 2005). There are two remarkable exceptions, though: Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005)
¯nd a signi¯cant positive abnormal return following upgrades after the introduction of
the Regulation Fair Disclosure on October 23, 2000 by the SEC. This regulatory change
prohibits U.S. public companies from making selective, non-public disclosures to favored
4investment professionals. Rating agencies, however, are exempted from this rule, which
seems to improve the ratings' informational content. Second, Goh and Ederington (1993)
¯nd a signi¯cant negative abnormal return only for downgrades associated with a deterio-
ration of the ¯rm's expected ¯nancial performance but not for those attributed to a reor-
ganization or an increase in ¯nancial leverage. Regarding cross-sectional aspects, stronger
market e®ects are generally found for downgrades to and within the sub-investment-grade
rating category (Goh and Ederington, 1999).
With respect to bond price reactions, Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) report
signi¯cant abnormal bond returns following rating changes, while Wansley, Glascock, and
Clauretie (1992) con¯rm a signi¯cant (negative) e®ect only for downgrades. Likewise, Hite
and Warga (1997) ¯nd the strongest market reaction for downgrades to and within the
junk-bond grade class. Comparing stock market and bond price e®ects following rating
changes, Wansley and Clauretie (1985) report that the bond market appears to be less
e±cient in the sense that relative bond prices tend to react as long as seven months after
a rating change.
Very few studies have yet examined the market reaction to watchlist events. Using
Standard and Poor's Credit Watch data with 253 observations of which 38 are upgrades
in the period 1981 to 1983, Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) ¯nd no signi¯cant
e®ect for the overall sample. After partitioning the sample into expected and unexpected
additions to the watchlist, however, they report a negative abnormal return for those bor-
rowers that were unexpectedly put on the watchlist with designation downgrade. However,
they do not follow credit watch additions to their ultimate watchlist resolution, so that an
important piece of information is not taken into account in their study. The same caveat
holds for the study by Wansley and Clauretie (1985). Focussing on the same sample of
S&P's watchlist additions between 1981 and 1983, they ¯nd a signi¯cant abnormal market
reaction only for watchlist downgrades as compared to ¯rms that were directly re-rated
within the same time period (without review listing).
Purda (2006) examines the stock market reaction to expected and unexpected rating
changes in a sample ranging from 1991 to 2002. Rating reviews in this study serve as one
5ingredient to rating change expectations. She ¯nds that, while upgrades again do not lead
to signi¯cant e®ects, stock market reactions are roughly the same for predicted and unpre-
dicted rating downgrades. Hill and Fa® (2007), to the best of our knowledge, are the ¯rst
to directly compare the market e®ects of rating changes that were preceded by watchlist
procedures with those that were not. However, they do not analyze corporate borrowers'
ratings but focus on sovereign ratings. By using rating information from Moody's, S&P
and Fitch, they are able to comment on the relative information content re°ected in dif-
ferent rating actions. Again, they ¯nd that positive rating events (i.e. direct upgrades or
reviews with direction upgrade) are non-informative in that they do not lead to signif-
icant market reactions. As their main result, they conclude that watch-preceded rating
downgrades do not trigger any stronger market reaction than direct downgrades. This
¯nding is also supported by Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) who con¯rm that while ad-
ditions to the watchlist (with designation downgrade) are informative, the eventual rating
downgrades themselves are not. Interestingly, Hill and Fa® (2007) also report that prior
to a watch-preceded downgrade the market seems to anticipate the event by displaying
signi¯cant negative returns but reacts signi¯cantly positive after the downgrade.
Our work di®ers from the aforementioned studies in several respects. Most impor-
tantly, we study the full development of the watchlist instrument both in a time-series
dimension and cross-sectionally. Apart from a comprehensive analysis of this relatively
new rating instrument, we intend to question the motivation behind setting up this addi-
tional rating procedure. By focussing on stock market reactions to watchlist resolutions
and comparing them to direct rating action, we try to test between the \buying time"
hypothesis and the \implicit contracting" argument. Finally, we complement our study by
brie°y examining the market e®ects of the review listing itself, i.e. the \on-watch" e®ects,
as well. These, however, are likely to deliver contaminated results as market reactions
tend to be additionally in°uenced by the events that triggered the watchlist placement in
the ¯rst place. Our main results regarding the watchlist's economic rationale are therefore
based on the \ex-post" e®ects, i.e. on watchlist resolutions.
63 The Watchlist-Procedure: Theory and Hypotheses
Our empirical study is based on the complete history of Moody's ratings. On October
1, 1991, Moody's signi¯cantly altered its rating process. Additionally to the usual rating
procedures, a so-called watchlist was formally added to its arsenal of rating instruments.
Generally, review listings are \designed to inform investors of Moody's opinion that the
credit quality of an obligation or obligor may be changing"(Keenan et al., 1998) and
as such imply a public announcement of rating investigation. Interestingly, such rating
reviews existed as early as 1985 and were published from the beginning. However, watchlist
assignments were only considered formal rating actions from 1991 on. From this time, both
the decision to put an issuer or issue \on watch" and the subsequent watchlist resolution,
i.e. the ¯nal rating action, had to be made by a rating committee.
Review listings are usually triggered by sudden events that are likely to a®ect an
issuer's future credit quality, i.e. his willingness and / or ability to repay debt. Among the
most common causes are the announcements of a merger or of other corporate changes. A
rating may be put on review for possible downgrade or upgrade or with direction uncertain.
Resolution from the watchlist hence implies either an upgrade, a downgrade, or a rating
con¯rmation. During the watchlist interval - an average period of 103 days (Keenan, Fons,
and Carty, 1998)5 - the rating agency typically requests additional information from the
¯rm, thereby entering into a dialogue between rating analysts and lead management. The
watchlist period ends with the announcement of the rating decision.
If a ¯rm is placed on watchlist with designation downgrade, the watchlist resolution
will commonly be either a downgrade or no change at all (a con¯rmation). An upgrade is
very rare in this case. Keenan, Fons, and Carty (1998) report that less than 1% of watchlist
resolutions are such reversals. The ratio between rating change and con¯rmation depends
on the placement direction: in the downgrade (upgrade) case its roughly 65% (75%)
5In the study by Keenan, Fons, and Carty (1998), the 10% (90%) quantile is 22 (95) days for ¯rms that
are placed on watchlist with designation downgrade. For ¯rms entering the watchlist with designation
upgrade the mean is 115 days with 21 (218) as the 10% (90%) quantile.
7changes and 25% (15%) con¯rmations.6 The initial watchlist designation hence puts a
strong prior on the eventual rating action.7
Several questions may be raised with respect to the economic rationale behind the
watchlist procedure. As a ¯rst step, we are interested in whether or not the introduction
of the watchlist instrument generally in°uenced the informational content of ratings. We
therefore test for a time-break in the e®ects of rating changes on the value of ¯rm equity,
i.e. on the cumulative abnormal stock return, before and after the formal introduction of
the watchlist on October 1, 1991. In our analysis, we focus mainly on rating downgrades,
since upgrades very rarely deliver any signi¯cant results. If relevant, however, we also
comment on the implications of positive rating changes.8 Disregarding any di®erences
between direct downgrades and watch-preceded downgrades (i.e. watchlist resolutions
leading to a downgrade) in the post-watchlist period (i.e. from October 1, 1991, on),
we should expect a larger market e®ect in the post-watchlist era. This leads to our ¯rst
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The e®ect of downgrade announcements on the market value of ¯rm equity
is stronger in the post-watchlist era, as compared to the era before the introduction of the
watchlist procedure.
Apart from the above mentioned argument, a con¯rmation of hypothesis 1 could
also be due to simple time trends or reasons of sample composition. Blume, Lim, and
MacKinlay (1998), for instance, suggest that rating standards applied by credit rating
agencies may have hardened over time. If true, this implies that for a given ¯rm quality
(measured in terms of observable ¯nancial variables and ratios) agencies tend to assign
lower rating notches over time. Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) con¯rm this hypothesis
for the 1980s and early 90s. Even if rating standards remained the same, however, the
6Values do not add up to 100%, because ratings could also be withdrawn or continue to be on watchlist
(Keenan, Fons, and Carty (1998)).
7However, any \on watch" e®ect will very likely be superposed with the event triggering the watchlist
designation in the ¯rst place.
8If not displayed in the paper, the results from rating upgrades are available upon request.
8average market reaction to rating announcements may have been a®ected by a sample-
composition e®ect. If the reaction to a downgrade di®ers across rating notches and the
sample population is not stationary with respect to the distribution of ¯rms across rating
notches, the cumulative abnormal return may be a®ected even if there is no e®ective
change in rating policy.
The second hypothesis therefore controls for these two additional e®ects:
Hypothesis 2 The watchlist e®ect on a ¯rm's market value of equity is not explained by
a change in rating standards nor by the sample composition.
Finally, hypothesis 3 considers the economic rationale underlying rating agencies'
decision to set up an institutionalized rating review process. Two di®erent arguments
may be distinguished: First, a review listing may be seen as a rating agency's means to
\buy time" before a ¯nal judgement on a change in a borrower's credit quality has to be
made. In this respect, an agency would choose to directly change a rating if she is certain
that the change in the borrower's credit quality is su±ciently strong and long-lasting and
would put him under review otherwise. Over the watchlist period, the rating agency would
either actively collect additional information about the borrower's repayment capability
or passively wait for new information to arrive exogenously. In either case, the watchlist
procedure would be terminated as soon as a su±cient certainty about the change in
the borrower's credit quality is obtained. Ex-post, therefore, a direct downgrade and a
watchlist downgrade would imply the same informational content. The decision to add
the rating to the watchlist, in contrast, would be an uninformative event according to this
hypothesis.
Second, following the argument in Boot et al. (2006), the watchlist may also be
interpreted as an agency's means of entering into an \implicit contract" with the borrowing
¯rm. This argument is particularly compelling for the case of a negative watchlist, i.e. for
placements with direction downgrade. In this case, a rating agency would decide on a direct
downgrade if she is again su±ciently certain that the ¯rm is not capable of improving its
credit quality in order to sustain its earlier rating. Firms with - from the agency's point
9of view - potential to maintain their credit quality but with questionable willingness to
do so, in contrast, will be put under review. Resolution of the watchlist, according to this
argument, makes a statement on the borrower's willingness to hold up his earlier rating.
Consequently, watchlist downgrades should re°ect only relatively small changes in credit
quality due to insu±cient e®ort, while direct rating downgrades should be associated with
exogenously triggered and therefore presumably larger deteriorations of credit quality. In
this respect, direct rating changes may be more informative regarding the change in the
borrower's creditworthiness than watch-preceded rating downgrades. Note that due to the
implicit contracting argument, watchlist additions should be informative events. The \on
watch" e®ect would then contain the market's reaction to the agency's statement that the
borrower is capable to sustain his initial rating, while the \o® watch" e®ect would refer
to the information of whether or not the borrower is willing to do so.
We phrase hypothesis 3 such that con¯rmation would be support for the \buying
time" argument, while rejection would subscribe to the \implicit contracting" reasoning:
Hypothesis 3 The e®ect of a direct downgrade on the value of ¯rm equity is not stronger
than the e®ect of a watchlist-preceded downgrade.
4 Data selection and descriptive statistics
Our data comprises the complete history of Moody's estimated senior unsecured ratings
and rating changes. Since Moody's started to add numerical modi¯ers to its whole letter
ratings in April 26, 1982, we chose to exclude all rating information prior to this date. Note
that estimated senior unsecured ratings are usually calculated as issuer ratings, rarely as
issue ratings. By using this type of rating we avoid the problem of multiple ratings for
one issuer, which facilitates comparability across ¯rms and also over time.9
9In case of multiple ratings, the watchlist decision cannot be attributed to a particular issue rating.
Therefore, we assume that it a®ects all outstanding ratings of this ¯rm. For a detailed description of the
respective algorithm employed by Moody's to calculate the issuer rating, see Hamilton (2005).
10To give a ¯rst overview, table 1 reports the number of rated companies as well as the
mean rating for a given year in the sample period. Consistent with the existing literature,
Moody's letter ratings have been converted into a numerical scale, where 1 is equivalent to
Aaa, 2 is equivalent to Aa1,..., and 21 is equivalent to C. As can be seen, the mean rating
has declined monotonically over time. This is in line with Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay
(1998). However, the rating universe has also changed considerably throughout our ob-
servation period. The number of rated issuers has increased almost tenfold from 1982 to
2004. The observed rating deterioration may therefore have been caused by a rise in riski-
ness of the underlying pool of ¯rms - an argument that gives bite to the test of hypothesis
2.
Table 2 reports all Moody's issuer rating events over the period April 26, 1982 to
December 31, 2004. Rating events are either direct rating downgrades or upgrades, i.e.
rating actions without a preceding watchlist, or watchlist placements with subsequent
resolution. The total data set consists of more than 25.000 events. The number of watchlist
placements per year is reported in column 3 (4) for direction downgrade (upgrade). As can
be seen from the table, designated watchlist downgrades are roughly twice as frequent as
upgrades. Over time, the number of watchlist events °uctuates, although two subperiods
can be distinguished. The ¯rst one comprises the early years of watchlist build-up (1991
to 1997), until in 1998 a relatively stable number of more than 1000 events per year has
been reached. The number of direct rating events is presented in columns 6 and 7 for
downgrades and upgrades, respectively. Upgrades are fairly stable across time, reaching a
peak in 2004. The picture looks somewhat di®erent for downgrades. They seem to display
a much stronger dependency on the business cycle,10 with a peak in the 1999-2001 period.
More recently, the number of upgrades exceeds downgrades. Comparing columns 2 and
5, we see that over the interval 2000 to 2004, more than 50% of overall rating action is
conducted via the watchlist.
Table 3 (4) provides the distribution of the number and the mean size of direct
10Using the NBER classi¯cation for recession we have three recession periods in our sample period:
April 1982 to November 1982, July 1990 to March 1991, and March 2001 to November 2001.
11and watchlist-preceded downgrades (upgrades) per year. Note that table 2 referred to
watchlist entries while tables 3 and 4 report information on watchlist resolutions.11 With
respect to the time series dimension, we dispose of considerably more data points in
the post-watchlist era as compared to the pre-watchlist era (2435 downgrades altogether
versus 1216, and 1273 upgrades versus 446). The proportion of direct to watchlist-driven
downgrades in the post-watchlist period is roughly 60:40, for upgrades it is 70:30. This
again con¯rms the perception that the watchlist has become an important tool for rating
agencies. Comparing the average size of rating changes, we can also see that watchlist
changes on average tend to be larger than direct rating changes, with the e®ect being
more pronounced for upgrades than for downgrades. Over time, however, downgrades
(upgrades) seem to have decreased (slightly increased) with respect to the size of the
rating change.
A summary of the size distribution of downgrades (upgrades) is given in table 5
(6). During the pre-watchlist era, we ¯nd a higher proportion of more-than-1-notch rat-
ing downgrades as compared to both the post-watchlist period in general and watchlist-
downgrades in particular. In contrast, whereas 49.1% of all downgrades in the pre-watchlist
period are a change by one notch, this proportion rises to 58.07% in the post-watchlist
era. This may, however, at least partly be also a consequence of the favorable economic
conditions prevailing during most of the 1990s, given that the number of downgrades is
positively correlated with recessions. In the post-watchlist period, watch-preceded down-
grades seem to be slightly larger than direct downgrades (the proportion of rating changes
larger than 2 notches is a bit higher). Similar results are obtained with respect to upgrades:
in particular, we ¯nd that watch-preceded upgrades tend to be larger than direct upgrades.
Using standard event study methodology (MacKinlay (1997)) we calculate the cumu-
lative abnormal stock return in response to a rating event over a short window surrounding
the event date. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated as the cumulative
11As we match rating information with ¯rm-speci¯c data later on, we also restrict the reported database
to include only those ¯rms' ratings for which stock price information is available. This considerably reduces
our database.
12stock return over the event window minus the return of the market portfolio. The event
window spans 3 days, beginning at -1 and ending at +1, with the event being the direct
rating change or watchlist rating change. Our estimation window spans the time period
-120 to -20. Stock price information is taken from CRSP daily tapes. The market model is
calculated using the value-weighted index in CRSP. Events with insu±cient stock market
data in the estimation or event window are excluded from our analysis.
Both in the univariate and in the multivariate analysis to be described in the following
sections, we used several further re¯nements on our data. First, we decided to delete all
watchlist entries that led to rating reversals (e.g., additions to the watchlist with direction
upgrade that were downgraded subsequently). This deletion of data is uncritical as we
lose only six observations altogether. Second, we control for contaminated data, i.e. all
rating events that were tied to obvious events such as corporate mergers etc. (Jorion,
Liu, and Shi, 2005). An observation is considered as contaminated if any ¯rm-speci¯c,
price-relevant information appears in the Wall Street Journal within a three-day window
surrounding the event day of rating change. With respect to downgrades, for instance,
our dataset is thereby reduced from 3651 to 3180.
Given the watchlist procedure, there are e®ectively two dates that may produce an-
nouncement e®ects, namely the on-watchlist day and the o®-watchlist day. Since ¯rms are
supposedly put on the watchlist only when their credit quality changes unexpectedly, \on-
watch" events may be expected to be superposed with other unique and value-relevant
events (Keenans, Fons, and Carty, 1998; Linciano, 2004). In such cases, an abnormal
return captures both factors at the same time, the corporate event and the rating an-
nouncement. Even controlling for \contaminated" data may not completely solve this
problem. Furthermore, we know that the watchlist designation puts a strong prior on the
expected ¯nal resolution. In order to get a \clean" return, we therefore abstract from
the on-watchlist e®ects in our main analysis, thereby biasing our results against ¯nding
any pre/post watchlist-era e®ect. We will, however, at least brie°y comment on potential
on-watch e®ects in the univariate analysis to assess the magnitude of these impacts. As
an additional test, we also use an event window spanning over the total watchlist period.
135 Informational Content of Credit Watches
Hypothesis 1 claims that ratings have become more informative since the watchlist has
been institutionalized. The results of a univariate test of this hypothesis are displayed
in table 7. It shows the simple e®ects of rating changes on cumulative abnormal stock
returns, di®erentiating between market reactions before and after the introduction of the
watchlist procedure.
Overall, our results are consistent with previous research. In particular, we ¯nd statis-
tically signi¯cant negative CARs following downgrades. Furthermore, the general market
reaction to downgrades (both direct and watch-preceded) seems to be stronger in the post-
watchlist era with a CAR of -3.26% than in the pre-watchlist period with only ¡2:16%.
The di®erence is both statistically and economically signi¯cant. This result lends support
to hypothesis 1 as it states that ratings have indeed become more informative after the
introduction of the watchlist, thereby increasing the negative stock price reaction to a
rating downgrade. For upgrades, in contrast, we ¯nd no signi¯cant market reaction.12
Univariate results hence seem to support hypothesis 1. We now proceed to a test in
a multivariate framework. As the univariate analysis indicated insigni¯cant CAR e®ects
from upgrades, we focus solely on downgrades in the following, using model 1,
CARj = ¯0 + ¯1 RCHANGEj + ¯2 IGRADEj + ¯3 DAY Sj
+¯4 POST1991
¤RCHANGEj + ¯5 POST1991
¤IGRADEj (1)
+¯6 POST1991
¤DAY Sj + ²j:
In line with Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005), we test the
in°uence of the size of the rating change (in number of notches, RCHANGE), the crossing
of the investment grade boundary (a dummy variable, IGRADE), and ¯nally the number
of days since the previous rating action13 (DAYS) on the cumulative abnormal return of
¯rm j. In order to test hypothesis 1, we create a dummy variable (POST1991) equal to 1
12Note that our results do not change if we use di®erent methods of calculating CARs. As an alternative,
e.g., we used the method by Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991).
13Our results are virtually unchanged if we use the on-watchlist date instead of the o®-watchlist date.
14if the rating event falls into the post-watchlist era, and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable
enters our model as an interaction term with the other control variables.
Focussing on the e®ects of rating downgrades, we expect to ¯nd a negative coe±cient
for RCHANGE. Ratings are proxies for default risk. To the extent that a rating change
conveys new information to the market, a downgrade should raise the ¯rm's future debt
re¯nancing costs and, hence, lower the ¯rm's market value. This negative e®ect should
increase in the size of the rating change. Note that the probability of default rises ex-
ponentially with decreasing rating notches, so that a downgrade by two notches has an
e®ect on the ¯rm's net worth more than twice as large as a one-notch rating change.
The variable IGRADE is expected to display a negative coe±cient as well. Large in-
vestors, pension funds in particular, are usually not allowed to hold non-investment grade
rated products.14 When bonds pass the boundary to junk status, portfolio managers are
often forced to sell. Thus, the market for investment-grade bonds may di®er substantially
in terms of participants, volume, and risk preferences from the market for junk bonds,
leading to a downward jump in the CAR due to a crossing of the investment-grade bound-
ary. However, as we use issuer ratings (senior unsecured ratings), this e®ect may be weaker
than for issue ratings.
With respect to regressor DAYS, both a positive and a negative coe±cient may be
conceivable. On the one hand, the longer the time period between two sequential ratings,
the stronger may be the informational novelty of a downgrade, leading to a strongly neg-
ative e®ect on CAR. On the other hand, the more time passes, the more likely it becomes
that the market has already updated its belief with respect to the creditworthiness of the
borrower based on other pieces of private and public information. In this case, a rating
change does no longer convey new information to the market (Jorion, Liu, and Shi, 2005).
A downgrade may even lead to a positive market reaction if it is less pronounced than
the hitherto uncon¯rmed market pessimism.
Our key variable in model 1 is the interaction of RCHANGE with the POST1991-
dummy. If this variable turns out to be signi¯cantly negative, this should con¯rm hypoth-
14For an overview of rating-related regulation of investment decisions, see Partnoy (2002).
15esis 1 that the introduction of the watchlist has increased the informational content of
rating events. We also include interaction variables with the IGRADE and DAYS vari-
ables. However, we cannot o®er clear predictions with regard to the signs of these two
variables and include them mainly for consistency.
The results of model 1 are presented in table 8, column 2.While variable RCHANGE
displays the expected negative sign and is highly signi¯cant, regressor IGRADE turns
out to be economically and statistically signi¯cantly positive. One explanation for this
could be the high degree of activity in the junk bond market during the 1980s. This may
be supported by the negative but insigni¯cant POST1991*IGRADE dummy, indicating
that after the breakdown of the junk bond market a downgrade from investment grade
to speculative grade is perceived as negative information. However, the combined e®ect is
not statistically signi¯cant. Variable DAYS turns out to be insigni¯cant. When interacted
with the POST1991 dummy, however, the DAYS regressor yields a statistically highly
signi¯cant and positive coe±cient. For our key variable, POST1991*RCHANGE, we ¯nd
indeed a signi¯cantly negative coe±cient. Given that the economic e®ect of this regressor
is much stronger than that of the simple RCHANGE variable (¡0:017 versus ¡0:006),
the informational content of rating downgrades seems to have strongly risen due to the
introduction of the watchlist. This is consistent with hypothesis 1.
6 Time Trends and Sample Composition
6.1 Robustness Test I - Time Trend
So far, our results tend to con¯rm hypothesis 1 on the changing informational content
of rating changes after the introduction of the watchlist procedure on October 1, 1991.
However, there are alternative explanations for our ¯ndings which are summarized in
hypothesis 2. This section addresses the time trend in some of our variables as explanatory
factor for the observed pattern of regression coe±cients. We test this conjecture using
two alternative speci¯cations for time trend. First, following Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay
16(1998), we include a set of (n-1) year dummies into the regression equation of model 1 in
order to capture a linear time trend. This constitutes model 2. The results are presented
in table 8, column 3. Note that the year dummies' coe±cients are not displayed.
As can be seen from the table, the introduction of the time trend hardly changes the
earlier results. In particular, is has no e®ect on the economic and statistic signi¯cance
of our key variable POST1991*RCHANGE, even though the coe±cient increases slightly
from ¡0:017 to ¡0:014. Variable IGRADE loses weakly in statistical signi¯cance. This
again strengthens the view that the positive sign in model 1 is time dependent. Note that
the POST1991*IGRADE variable is almost unchanged in value but remains statistically
insigni¯cant.
In order to allow for the time series of coe±cients to follow a macroeconomic cycle, we
also included a business cycle dummy, labeled BCYCLE, to constitute model 3. It equals
one if the observation is from an NBER recession period, and 0 otherwise. According to the
NBER criterion there were three recessions in our sample period: April 1982 to November
1982, July 1990 to March 1991, and March 2001 to November 2001. Results are given in
table 8, column 4. We ¯nd the business cycle dummy to have a positive, but statistically
insigni¯cant e®ect. Compared to model 1, the remaining results are unchanged. Overall,
the tests performed in this section lend support to hypothesis 2. Although we ¯nd evidence
of a time dependence in our data, this cannot explain the di®erent abnormal returns in
the two subperiods.
6.2 Robustness Test II - Sample Composition
A second robustness check concerns the development of corporate ¯nancial risk over our
sample period. Again, we use two distinct approaches. The ¯rst directly addresses the
capital structure of the ¯rms in our sample, while the second refers to the sample com-
position e®ect, which is relevant here because the mapping of rating notches into the
probability space is non-linear.
In order to control for changes in the capital structure of the rated ¯rms, which
17by itself may explain the increasing response of stock prices to a given rating in the
post-watchlist era, we include two measures of leverage to obtain model 4: the ratio of
short-term debt to total assets (SHORT), and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets
(LONG).15 Since the marginal costs of a rating change are directly proportional to the
volume of debt ¯nancing, in particular short-term debt ¯nancing, we expect the coe±cients
to be negative for both variables.
The results are reported in table 8, column 5. Again, the inclusion of the additional
capital structure variables does not alter the sign nor the signi¯cance of the regressors
of model 1. Adjusted R2 of the extended speci¯cation rises from 2.52% in model 1 to
4.18 %. The leverage variables have the expected sign and turn out roughly identical in
terms of economic signi¯cance. Since all other variables of the original model 1 are largely
una®ected, we conclude that the increased leverage in the post-watchlist era a®ects CARs
but is unable to explain all variation in the two samples.
A second, alternative test concentrates on the exponential relation between rating
notches and probability of default. By using RCHANGE as a dependent variable in the
basic model, we have implicitly assumed that the distribution of ¯rms across rating notches
is stationary over the entire period. If, however, the composition of our sample shifts over
time to lower rating categories, as is consistent with table 1, and in these lower rating
categories a one notch rating change implies a larger increase in default probability, then
a sheer sample composition e®ect may just as well yield the results that we have found.
From earlier studies, we know that a rating improvement by one notch, say from Baa3 to
Ba1, raises the probability of default from 0.52% to 0.81%. However, a rating change from
Ba3 to B1, which is also one notch, raises the default probability from 2.69% to 4.04%,
i.e. four times as much as in the ¯rst case (Keenan, Hamilton, and Berthault, 2000). The
exponential rise in default probability is particularly pronounced in the non-investment
grade sector of the rating scale.16 To capture these e®ects, we include dummy variables
into model 1 for each whole letter rating class (i.e. AA, A, BAA, BA, B), where the
15Our results do not change if we use, e.g., total debt scaled by the market value of the ¯rm.
16This line of argument is consistent with Jorion and Zhang (2007).
18dummy variable equals 1 if the rating of the ¯rm before the event falls into this rating
category, and 0 otherwise. This is model 5.
As can be seen from table 8, column 6, the dummies are both statistically and eco-
nomically signi¯cant. However, their inclusion does not change the signi¯cance nor the
sign of the coe±cients of model 1,17 but the absolute size of the coe±cients (the economic
signi¯cance) is altered. The e®ect of POST1991*RCHANGE decreases compared to the
basic regression. We may interpret this as evidence that there is indeed a sample composi-
tion e®ect, which partly explains the increased strength of the announcement e®ect in the
post-watchlist era.18 However, we are left with an unexplained part, that we attribute to
the enhanced informational value of the observed rating action. In sum, we ¯nd evidence
for hypothesis 2.
7 Watchlists' Economic Rationale
7.1 Univariate Results
We now turn to test hypothesis 3 on the economic rationale behind the introduction of
the watchlist procedure as an institutionalized rating instrument. Again, we start with a
univariate approach. Table 9 displays the CARs following from direct and watch-preceded
rating changes in the post-watchlist period. We ¯nd that direct rating downgrades trigger
a much stronger market reaction (-3.99%) than watch-preceded downgrades (-2.14%).
The di®erence is also highly signi¯cant (at the 1%-level) and as such hints at the implicit
contracting argument as a motivating factor for setting up the watchlist procedure. For
upgrades, no signi¯cant e®ects can be found.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the results so far considered only the \o®-
watch" e®ects. This procedure tends to underestimate the true stock market reaction to
17One exception is that the variable POST1991*IGRADE becomes statistically signi¯cant at the 5%
level.
18This result is strengthened by the fact that R2 increases strongly from 2.52% in model 1 to 5.35% in
model 5.
19rating changes, because the anticipatory e®ect implicit in the price reaction to the on-
watchlist announcement, i.e. at the beginning of the watchlist period, has been neglected.
Table 10 at least gives an indication with respect to the omitted anticipation e®ects. As
can be seen, the market reacts strongly negative to a watchlist addition with designation
downgrade, but signi¯cantly positive to watchlist additions with direction uncertain and
upgrade. Given the strong dependence between the initial watchlist designation and the
¯nal resolution,19 an analysis of review listings with direction uncertain seems to be the
most fruitful exercise as it should allow the least biased results. The positive market
reaction in this case tends to be supportive for the implicit contracting argument. While
under the \buying time" hypothesis, the announcement of a watchlist addition should
not be informative at all, the implicit contracting argument sees a review listing as a
(relatively) positive signal with respect to the borrower's credit quality: while it is not yet
certain that he is willing to do so, at least he is capable of sustaining his creditworthiness.
This should warrant the observed increase in CAR following the neutral watchlist addition.
In order to reconcile the results of tables 9 and 10, we conducted an additional, uni-
variate robustness test. Table 11 displays the market reaction to direct and watch-preceded
downgrades, where CARs have been measured using an event window starting one day
before the watchlist announcement and ending one day after the watchlist resolution.20 To
facilitate comparability we use the mean length of the watchlist period in our sample as
the length of the event window for direct rating changes. As can be seen, our former result
is con¯rmed: the market reacts much more strongly to direct rating downgrades than to
watch-preceded downgrades, with a strongly signi¯cant di®erence. Again, this supports
the implicit contracting argument.
19In our sample, for instance, the probability of a downgrade, given the ¯rm is placed on watchlist with
designation downgrade, is 0.64.
20In our sample, the watchlist spans a time period between 13 and 266 days. The median length is 79
days.
207.2 Multivariate Results
When testing hypothesis 3 in a multivariate approach, we face a potential methodological
problem, though: As rating agencies should be expected to preselect ¯rms for addition
to the watchlist, the di®erence in e®ects from direct rating action versus watch-preceded
rating action becomes endogenous.
In order to account for this preselection, we extend our empirical model towards a
two-step regression. The ¯rst regression contains the agency's decision to put a ¯rm on
the watchlist, while the second captures the relation between the rating change and the
market's reaction to it. Note that these two equations constitute a sequential equation
model: the watchlist placement in°uences the observed cumulative abnormal returns but
not vice versa. Such recursive equation models can be estimated consistently using OLS,
provided that the error terms of the two equations are uncorrelated. We hence proceed
as follows: First we use a logit regression, modelling the watchlist-addition decision of the
rating agency. Second, we test hypothesis 3, including all variables found signi¯cant in
the ¯rst step as control variables.
We commence our sample selection process by using all events with either a watchlist
assignment with designation downgrade or with a direct downgrade in the post-watchlist
period (October 1, 1991, to December 31, 2004). We exclude events with insu±cient
balance sheet information. In line with earlier work on capital structure (e.g. Flannery
and Rangan (2006)) we exclude ¯nancial (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated (SIC 4900-4999)
¯rms from the regression, since their capital structure di®ers markedly from those of other
companies. This leads to a total sample of 4351 observations.
To perform the logit regression, we create a dummy variable WATCHLIST PLACE-
MENT equal to 1 if the rating is placed on watchlist with direction downgrade, and 0
otherwise. Independent variables referring to the ¯rm's ability to react to the require-
ments set forth by the rating agency during the course of the watchlist period are likely
determinants of review placement. Obvious candidates in this respect should be measures
of ¯nancial and technological °exibility. We measure ¯nancial °exibility as cash°ow di-
21vided by total assets (CASHFLOW). The more ¯nancial slack the ¯rm has at hand (as
measured by CASHFLOW), the more the ¯rm is able to, e.g., retire debt. We therefore
expect CASHFLOW to have a positive e®ect on watchlist placement. We follow MacKay
and Phillips (2005) in using CAPITAL INTENSITY (¯xed assets over number of em-
ployees) as a proxy for technological °exibility. The higher the capital intensity of the
production technology used by the ¯rm the more di±cult recovery e®ort becomes. Thus,
we expect a negative impact of this variable on the watchlist placement decision.
The likelihood of being placed on review should also be positively correlated with
management quality. Following Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006), we proxy quality of
management using SIZE, calculated as the logarithm of book value of assets. We further-
more include two variables for capital structure in our regression: LEVERAGE is measured
as the book value of total debt over the market value of the ¯rm, whereas SHORT gives
the proportion of debt due within one year to total debt. We include LEVERAGE because
we expect ¯rms with higher leverage to be more exposed to an increase in the cost of debt
caused by a rating deterioration. This should, in turn, increase the ¯rm's willingness to
comply with the agency's request. Thus, we expect a positive sign for the LEVERAGE
variable. Likewise, the proportion of short term debt should have a positive sign, since
these liabilities expire within the next year, therefore making the consequences of a rating
change more severe.
We also include the degree of competition in the industry (COMPETITION), even
though we cannot o®er a clear prediction with regard to this regressor's sign. While
competition may be positively correlated with the willingness to engage in recovery e®ort,
highly competitive markets may also lead to less ¯nancial slack, which reduces a ¯rm's
ability to exert recovery e®ort. The degree of competition is calculated as the number of
¯rms per year from Compustat operating in the industry where each industry is given by
its 4-digit SIC code. Finally, we also follow MacKay and Phillips (2005) and consider the
variable RISK, calculated as the standard deviation of cash°ow to total assets using a
minimum of 4 annual observations. We expect ¯rms with a higher variability of cash°ow
22to be less able to engage in recovery e®ort.21
Thus, the ¯rst regression model with respect to the watchlist decision is given by
WATCHLIST PLACEMENTj = ¯0 + ¯1 SIZEj + ¯2 LEV ERAGEj
+¯3 CASHFLOWj + ¯4 SHORTj + ¯5 CAPITAL INTENSITYj (2)
+¯6 COMPETITIONj + ¯7 RISKj + ²j :
All variables are evaluated at, or immediately before, the announcement date.22 Results
are reported in Table 12. All variables have the expected sign. Only the two capital struc-
ture variables, LEVERAGE and SHORT, display a negative instead of the expected pos-
itive sign.23 Financial °exibility (CASHFLOW), management quality (SIZE) and capital
structure (LEVERAGE) moreover turn out to be highly signi¯cant, while capital inten-
sity, competition, and risk are insigni¯cant. Nevertheless, the regression has a pseudo R2
of only 7.9%, i.e. it is rather low.
We now turn to test hypothesis 3 using the following model,
CARj = ¯0 + ¯1 RCHANGEj + ¯2 IGRADEj + ¯3 DAY Sj
+¯4 WATCHLIST
¤RCHANGEj + ¯5 WATCHLIST
¤IGRADEj (3)
+¯6 WATCHLIST
¤DAY Sj + ¯7 SIZEj + ¯8 LEV ERAGEj
¯9 CASHFLOWj + ²j :
Here, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for ¯rm j, RCHANGE,
IGRADE, and DAYS are the same as in model 1, and the control variables SIZE, LEVER-
21In an earlier version of the paper, we also included the value of rated debt outstanding. Yet, as results
stay virtually the same, we decided to abstain from considering this additional regressor.
22The announcement date refers to either the date the ¯rm is placed on watchlist with direction
downgrade or the date of the direct downgrade.
23Obviously, therefore, rating agencies perceive these capital structure variables to be more important
in in°uencing a ¯rm's capability rather than its willingness to uphold the initial rating. This may be
taken as additional support for our assumption that proof of lacking e®ort to sustain credit quality (i.e.
a watchlist downgrade) leads to a smaller market reaction than proof of lacking ability to do so (i.e. a
direct downgrade).
23AGE, and CASHFLOW are the same as in the logit regression. We exclude SHORT be-
cause the variable only weakly in°uences the watchlist versus direct downgrade decision.
WATCHLIST is a dummy variable equal to one, if the ¯rm is downgraded after a preced-
ing watchlist, and 0 otherwise. Our key variable is the interaction between WATCHLIST
and RCHANGE. An insigni¯cant coe±cient would support hypothesis 3, that the watch-
list was introduced to \buy time" for investigating ¯rms with uncertain development,
while a signi¯cantly positive coe±cient would support the notion of implicit contracting
between the rating agency and the ¯rm during the watchlist episode.
Results are displayed in table 13, column 2. RCHANGE and DAYS turn out to be
statistically signi¯cant. This con¯rms our previous result that there is a strong in°uence
of these two variables on the cumulative abnormal return. The coe±cients of the other
control variables correspond to our overall ¯ndings in the logit regression. An exception is
the SIZE variable, which is insigni¯cant, implying that the di®erence in abnormal return
is not correlated with ¯rm size, respectively with management quality.
Our key variable WATCHLIST*RCHANGE turns out to be positive and statistically
signi¯cant at the 1% level. This implies that watch-preceded downgrades lead to a less
negative CAR reaction than direct downgrades. Therefore we can reject hypothesis 3 of
equivalent stock market reactions for direct and watch-preceded downgrades.
There is, however, a severe line of criticism that could potentially invalidate our
interpretation of the watchlist as an \implicit contract": the assumption of uncorrelated
error terms of the two equations may be incorrect. Due to the rather low R2, correlation
could be simply caused by omitted variables in the watchlist placement equation. Such
a simultaneous equation problem would have to be estimated by two-stage least squares
procedures.
In order to validate our results, we therefore use an instrumental variable approach.
Valid instruments have to be (i) uncorrelated with the error term of the second equation on
the stock market reaction, (ii) should be correlated with the watchlist placement decision
of the rating agency and (iii) may not be included as an explanatory variable in the CAR-
equation (Murray (2006)). For choosing an instrument we follow Boot, Milbourn, and
24Schmeits (2006). They propose the quality of management - approximated by size - as an
important factor for watchlist placements. The better the quality of the management, the
higher is the likelihood that the ¯rm will be placed on watch. In the watchlist placement
decision regression displayed in table 12, we ¯nd indeed a signi¯cantly positive relationship
between watchlist placement and size, implying that size is correlated with the watchlist
decision even after controlling for other potential explanatory variables. Additionally, due
to the relatively large size of rated entities in general, we expect no signi¯cant correlation
between a speci¯c company's size and the market reaction to rating changes. This is also
supported by earlier studies by Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) or Faulkender and Petersen
(2006).
The results from an instrumental variable approach using SIZE as instrument are
reported in 13, column 3.24 While the economic signi¯cance of variables is reduced, sta-
tistical signi¯cance is unchanged. The variable WATCHLIST in particular turns out to
be positive and highly signi¯cant, implying, again, that watch-preceded downgrades lead
to less negative CARs than direct downgrades.25 This corroborates our earlier conclu-
sion that the introduction of the watchlist instrument seems to be driven by \implicit
contracting" rather than by arguments to \buy time".
8 Conclusion
Our study examined whether the formal introduction of the watchlist procedure by
Moody's in 1991 in°uenced the informational content of credit ratings and possibly ex-
tended the economic role that rating agencies play on ¯nancial markets. We ¯nd that
indeed after institutionalizing the watchlist process, rating downgrades trigger stronger
24Performing the same regression using the CARs including both the \on-watchlist" as well as the
\o®-watchlist" event con¯rms the results of table 13.
25As Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) ¯nd that SIZE and CARs are correlated after the introduction of
regulation FD in October 2000, we re-estimated our regression using only observations before the intro-
duction of regulation Fd in October 2000. This roughly cuts our sample in half. However, coe±cients
turn out to be not a®ected by this procedure.
25market reactions than in the pre-watchlist period. Furthermore, our empirical study lends
support to the hypothesis that the watchlist procedure allows rating agencies to enter into
an implicit contract with the rated ¯rms, as has been suggested by Boot, Milbourn, and
Schmeits (2006). Consequently, rating reviews add a \¯ner" piece of information to ¯nan-
cial markets: whereas direct rating downgrades make a statement on borrowers' (lack of)
capability to sustain their credit quality, watchlist downgrades inform market participants
of borrowers' willingness to do so.
Note that our results coincide with a second interpretation of the rating review instru-
ment: instead of promoting an \active" monitoring process via the watchlist, our ¯ndings
may as well speak for rating reviews - and possibly also rating outlooks - being (passively)
used as simply another rating classi¯cation re¯nement. Instead of adding yet more nu-
merical modi¯ers to the traditional, broad rating classes, the agencies may have started
to use these additional rating instruments to transfer information of a ¯ner granularity.26
Observation of this ¯ner type of rating information should then lead to a smaller market
reaction than observation of a coarser direct rating change, provided that market partici-
pants correctly account for this new type of information. Our empirical results may hence
also be seen as indicative of this mutual understanding between rating agencies and mar-
ket participants. Yet, given numerous anecdotal evidence, the rating agencies' business
model seems to contain a vivid monitoring element, advocating the agencies' special role
as an active information intermediary and corroborating our results.
26This line of argument is supported also by Altman and Rijken (2005), who ¯nd that credit risk
information provided by rating agencies is improved by announcing \issuer ratings adjusted by their
outlook ratings".
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30Table 1: History of Moody's ratings 1982-2004: total number and average rating
The table reports the aggregate history of Moody's issuer ratings for the period between April 26, 1982
and December 31, 2004. The ¯rst column gives the year, the second the number of rated ¯rms in the
respective year. The third column reports the mean rating of all rated ¯rms in the given year. Consistent
with the existing literature, ratings have been transformed into a variable measured on a 21 point scale
where 1 is equivalent to Aaa, 2 is equivalent to Aa1, ..., and 21 is equivalent to C.
year # mean rating
1982 1277 8.07
1983 1429 8.16
1984 1575 8.16
1985 1902 8.20
1986 2241 8.58
1987 2612 8.88
1988 2861 8.98
1989 3131 9.06
1990 3349 9.13
1991 3534 9.18
1992 3815 9.15
1993 4229 9.23
1994 4756 9.34
1995 5187 9.37
1996 5691 9.45
1997 6333 9.56
1998 7119 9.87
1999 7691 10.06
2000 8111 10.14
2001 8467 10.20
2002 8849 10.33
2003 9198 10.48
2004 9681 10.50
31Table 2: History of Moody's ratings 1982-2004: total number of direct rating events and
watchlist events
The table reports the total number of Moody's watchlist entries and direct issuer ratings for a given year
between April 26, 1982 and December 31, 2004.
year watchlist events (direction) direct rating events
all downgrade upgrade all downgrade upgrade
1982 - - - 235 177 58
1983 - - - 282 161 121
1984 - - - 394 193 201
1985 - - - 448 272 176
1986 - - - 576 401 175
1987 - - - 455 293 162
1988 - - - 537 355 182
1989 - - - 603 431 172
1990 - - - 752 618 134
1991 0 0 0 705 544 161
1992 162 135 27 649 464 185
1993 323 218 105 439 253 186
1994 340 195 145 338 158 180
1995 516 263 253 459 221 238
1996 527 271 256 478 177 301
1997 709 449 260 651 302 349
1998 1420 1026 394 936 627 309
1999 1040 641 399 1354 1049 305
2000 1013 563 450 846 505 341
2001 1266 916 350 1198 884 314
2002 1405 1197 208 1051 788 263
2003 1122 742 380 728 453 275
2004 1028 451 577 720 295 425
Total 10871 7067 3804 14834 9621 5213
32Table 3: Distribution and size of rating changes by year - downgrades
The table contains number and mean size of rating downgrades for each year of the sample. The sample
period after October 1, 1991, includes direct changes as well as watchlist-preceded rating changes. Size
reports the mean of all rating changes (in notches) in a given year. Note that numbers have been corrected
(as compared to table 2) in order to allow for a matching with necessary ¯rm data later on.
year all downgrades watch-preceded downgrades
# size # size
1982 94 1.79 - -
1983 73 1.52 - -
1984 77 1.78 - -
1985 95 1.81 - -
1986 155 2.11 - -
1987 106 2.03 - -
1988 123 2.13 - -
1989 156 1.89 - -
1990 225 1.66 - -
1991 112 1.57 - -
1992 78 1.38 7 1.14
1993 87 1.54 30 1.5
1994 85 1.41 29 1.57
1995 103 1.52 35 1.42
1996 99 1.49 34 1.59
1997 98 1.43 36 1.44
1998 206 1.63 70 1.81
1999 244 1.68 85 1.6
2000 267 1.67 97 1.69
2001 398 1.76 139 1.83
2002 399 1.7 192 1.79
2003 229 1.58 132 1.58
2004 142 1.34 81 1.34
PRE1991 1216 1.84 - -
POST1991 2435 1.61 967 1.65
Total 3651 1.69 967 1.65
33Table 4: Distribution and size of rating changes by year - upgrades
The table contains number and mean size of rating upgrades for each year of the sample. The sample
period after October 1, 1991, includes direct changes as well as watchlist-preceded rating changes. Size
reports the mean of all rating changes (in notches) in a given year. Note that numbers have been corrected
(as compared to table 2) in order to allow for a matching with necessary ¯rm data later on.
year all downgrades watch-preceded downgrades
# size # size
1982 18 1.44 - -
1983 47 1.68 - -
1984 42 1.45 - -
1985 54 1.53 - -
1986 48 1.47 - -
1987 46 1.82 - -
1988 60 1.8 - -
1989 46 1.39 - -
1990 34 1.47 - -
1991 25 1.56 - -
1992 48 1.41 6 1.66
1993 84 1.51 23 1.43
1994 92 1.32 25 1.56
1995 79 1.32 20 1.65
1996 127 1.25 29 1.2
1997 102 1.18 18 1.33
1998 107 1.37 31 1.61
1999 89 1.22 25 1.36
2000 92 1.67 39 2.28
2001 81 1.27 25 1.56
2002 60 1.23 19 1.26
2003 97 1.17 46 1.19
2004 133 1.26 56 1.37
PRE1991 420 1.58 - -
POST1991 1191 1.24 362 1.49
Total 1611 1.38 362
34Table 5: Summary of rating downgrades by absolute magnitude
The table presents the number as well as the proportion of all 3651 rating downgrades in our sample by
absolute magnitude of the rating change. The sample is split into two periods: The pre-watchlist period
from April 26, 1982, to September 30, 1991 (PRE1991), and the post-watchlist period from October 1,
1991, to December 31, 2004 (POST1991). Rating change is the absolute value of rating change in notches.
PRE1991 POST1991
All From Watchlist
Rating Change # % # % # %
1 597 49.1 1414 58.07 560 57.91
2 385 31.66 703 28.87 266 27.51
3 147 12.09 218 8.95 89 9.2
4 53 4.36 66 2.71 33 3.41
5 11 0.9 22 0.9 13 1.34
6 11 0.9 7 0.29 4 0.41
7 7 0.58 2 0.08 - -
8 2 0.16 1 0.04 - -
9 1 0.08 2 0.08 2 0.21
10 1 0.08 - - - -
11 - - - - - -
12 1 0.08 - - - -
Total 1216 100 2435 100 967 100
35Table 6: Summary of rating upgrades by absolute magnitude
The table presents the number as well as the proportion of all 1719 rating upgrades in our sample by
absolute magnitude of the rating change. The sample is split into two periods: The pre-watchlist period
from April 26, 198,2 to September 30, 1991 (PRE1991), and the post-watchlist period from October 1,
1991, to December 31, 2004 (POST1991). Rating change is the absolute value of rating change in notches.
PRE1991 POST1991
All From Watchlist
Rating Change # % # % # %
1 260 61.9 952 79.93 263 72.65
2 115 27.38 180 15.11 66 18.23
3 26 6.19 26 2.18 15 4.14
4 10 2.38 14 1.18 9 2.49
5 4 0.95 9 0.76 4 1.1
6 2 0.48 4 0.34 1 0.28
7 2 0.48 2 0.17 1 0.28
8 - - - - - -
9 - - 2 0.17 1 0.28
10 - - 1 0.08 1 0.28
11 1 0.24 - - - -
12 - - - - - -
13 - - - - - -
14 - - 1 0.08 1 0.28
Total 420 100 1191 100 362 100
36Table 7: Stock market response to rating changes: PRE1991/POST1991
The table provides the cumulative abnormal returns for both direct and watch-preceded upgrades and
downgrades. The sample consists of only uncontaminated rating events in the period between April 26,
1982, and December 31, 2004. PRE1991 is used with reference to the pre-watchlist period from April
26, 1982, to September 30, 1991, while POST1991 denotes the post-watchlist era from October 1, 1991
to December 31, 2004. Panel A refers to downgrades, Panel B to upgrades. The cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) is calculated over a three-day event window (-1,+1) around the date the rating change
becomes e®ective. The CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return minus the return of the market
portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the value-weighted portfolio from CRSP. Wilcoxon T
values are given below the median and t-values below the mean. ***, **, and* indicate signi¯cance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Mean and median values are tested using one-sided t-test and Wilcoxon T
test, respectively.
Panel A: Downgrades
Mean Median CAR < 0(%)
PRE1991 -2.16 -0.71 58.74
(-6.68)*** (-6.74)***
POST1991 -3.26 -0.91 58.27
(-10.84)*** (-10.09)***
Di®erence -1.1 -0.2 -0.47
(POST1991-PRE1991) (-2.50)** (-1.44)
Panel B: Upgrades
Mean Median CAR < 0(%)
PRE1991 1.14 -0.41 48.81%
(0.64) (-0.08)
POST1991 0.001 -0.68 49.03%
(0.11) (-0.59)
Di®erence -1.139 0.27 0.22%
(POST1991-PRE1991) (-0.44) (-0.153)
37Table 8: The e®ect of watchlist introduction on the stock market reaction to rating down-
grades
The sample consists of 3180 non-contaminated downgrades in the period between April 26, 1982 and
December 31, 2004. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). RCHANGE is
the absolute value of rating change in notches; IGRADE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the rating
downgrade crosses the investment grade boundary, and 0 otherwise; DAYS is the log of the number of days
since the last rating change (downgrades as well as upgrades); POST1991 is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the observation is from the watchlist period (October 1, 1991 to December 31, 2004), and 0 otherwise;
BCYCLE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the rating change is from a time period de¯ned as recession
by NBER, and 0 otherwise; SHORT is calculated as short-term debt (Compustat item #34)/book value
of total assets (#6); LONG is calculated as long-term debt (#9)/book value of total assets (#6). AA, A,
BAA, BA, and B are dummy variables equal to 1 if the rating of the observation before the rating change
is within the respective rating class, and 0 otherwise. Note, that AA also includes rating changes coming
from AAA. Rating categories CAA and below serves as the reference category. ***, **, and * indicate
signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. t-values are given in parenthesis. All results are obtained
accounting for clustering in the sample.
explanatory variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5
INTERCEPT -0.009* 0.034 -0.01* 0.019** -0.068***
(-1.67) (0.28) (-1.68) (2.36) (-4.30)
RCHANGE -0.006* -0.008* -0.006* -0.004 -0.008**
(-1.82) (-2.08) (-1.81) (-1.58) (-2.48)
IGRADE 0.017** 0.017* 0.017* 0.015 0.014
(1.97) (1.93) (1.96) (1.45) (1.51)
DAYS -0.001 0 0 -0.003 0
(-1.02) (-0.59) (-1.05) (-0.32) (-0.77)
POST1991*RCHANGE -0.017*** -0.014** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.010**
(-3.97) (-2.08) (-3.98) (-3.66) (-2.29)
POST1991*IGRADE -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.014 -0.021
(-0.69) (-0.62) (-0.68) (-0.79) (-1.62)
POST1991*DAYS 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(3.73) (3.39) (3.75) (2.78) (3.32)
BCYCLE 0.013
(0.73)
SHORT -0.051***
(-4.48)
LONG -0.057***
(-3.73)
AA (or above) 0.082***
(5.68)
A 0.077
(5.43)
BAA 0.065***
(4.55)
BA 0.06***
(4.718)
B 0.033**
(2.26)
year dummies no yes no no no
Adj:R2(%) 2.52 3.48 2.53 4.18 5.35
F 5.64*** 2.89*** 4.92*** 12.61*** 11.35***
observations 3180 3180 3180 2849 3180
clusters 1532 1532 1532 1442 1532
38Table 9: Stock market response to rating changes: direct / watchlist ratings
The table provides the cumulative abnormal returns following upgrades and downgrades. The sample
consists of only uncontaminated rating events in the post-watchlist period from October 1, 1991, to
December 31, 2004. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated over a three-day event window
(-1,+1) around the date the rating change becomes e®ective. The CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock
return minus the return of the market portfolio, where the market portfolio is given by the value-weighted
portfolio from CRSP. Wilcoxon T values are given below the median and t-values below the mean. ***,
**, and* indicate signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Mean and median values are tested using
one-sided t-test and Wilcoxon T test, respectively.
Panel A: Downgrades
Mean Median CAR < 0(%)
Direct -3.99 -1.49 60.27
(-9.44)*** (-9.05)***
From Watchlist -2.14 -0.4 55.22
(-5.38)*** (-4.57)***
Di®erence 1.85 1.09 -5.05
(From Watchlist-Direct) (3.18)*** (3.06)***
Panel B: Upgrades
Mean Median CAR < 0(%)
Direct 0 0 49.40
(-0.37) (-0.53)
From Watchlist 0.18 -0.09 47.51
(0.76) (-0.19)
Di®erence 0.18 -0.09 -1.89
(From Watchlist-Direct) (0.84) (-0.15)
Table 10: Stock market response to watchlist additions
The table provides the cumulative abnormal returns following a watchlist addition. We di®erentiate
between watchlist additions with direction downgrade, uncertain and upgrade. The cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) is calculated over a three-day event window (-1,+1) around the date the watchlist addition
is announced. The CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return minus the return of the market portfolio,
where the market portfolio is given by the value-weighted portfolio from CRSP. P-values are given below
the mean. ***, **, and* indicate signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
# Mean Median CAR < 0 (%)
down 1083 -3.41 -0.86 58.26
(-8.18)*** (-7.65)***
uncertain 56 1.88 0.48 58.78
(2.40)** (0.32)
up 560 1.62 0.21 53.93
(4.43)*** (2.20)**
39Table 11: Stock market response to rating changes: direct / watchlist ratings
The table provides the cumulative abnormal returns following downgrades. The sample consists of only
uncontaminated rating events in the post-watchlist period from October 1, 1991, to December 31, 2004.
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated over a event window beginning one day before
watchlist placement and ending one day after watchlist resolution for ¯rms coming from watchlist. For
direct downgrades the event window is set as the the median length of the watchlist period in our sample.
The CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return minus the return of the market portfolio, where the
market portfolio is given by the value-weighted portfolio from CRSP. Wilcoxon T values are given below
the median and t-values below the mean. ***, **, and* indicate signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level. Mean and median values are tested using one-sided t-test and Wilcoxon T test, respectively.
Direct -13.09 -8.92 0.59
(-12.05)*** (-7.53)***
From Watchlist -0.67 -1.41 0.52
(-0.52) (-1.97)**
Di®erence 12.42 7.51 -0.07
(-5.33)*** (-4.119)
(From Watchlist-Direct)
40Table 12: Which ¯rms are put on watchlist?
The sample consists of 4351 direct downgrades and watchlist placements with direction downgrade in the
watchlist period between October 1, 1991 and December 31 2004, respectively. Ratings are issuer ratings
provided by Moody's. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is placed
on watchlist with designation downgrade, and 0 otherwise. SIZE is calculated as log of book value of total
assets (Compustat item #6); LEVERAGE is calculated as total debt (#9 + #34)/(total debt (#9 +
#34) + market value of equity (#199)); CASHFLOW is calculated as earnings before depreciation (#18)
/ book value of total assets (#6); SHORT is calculated as short-term debt(#34)/total debt (#9 + #34);
CAPITAL INTENSITY is calculated as property, plant, and equipment (#8)/ number of employees(#29);
COMPETITION is the number of ¯rms in a given industry in a given year reported by Compustat, where
industry is de¯ned by the 4-digit SIC code; ¯nally, RISK is calculated as the standard deviation of the
CASHFLOW variable de¯ned above. *** ,** , and * indicate signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
z-values are given in parenthesis.
explanatory variables coe±cient (z-statistic)
INTERCEPT -2.252***
(-10.16)
SIZE 0.254***
(10.52)
LEVERAGE -1.477***
(-9.46)
CASHFLOW 1.989***
(5.74)
SHORT -0.334*
(-1.84)
CAPITAL INTENSITY -0.016
(-0.43)
COMPETITION 0
(0.17)
RISK -0.273
(-0.92)
PseudoR2(%) 7.9
LR Â2 417.71***
observations 4351
41Table 13: CAR for ¯rms coming from watchlist vs. direct downgrades
The sample consists of 2353 downgrades in the watchlist period between October 1, 1991 and December
31, 2004. Ratings are issuer ratings provided by Moody's. The sample includes direct downgrades as well
as downgrades following watchlist placements. The results in colum 2 (3) are obtained using the OLS
(IV) estimation methods, where the IV approach uses SIZE as the instrument. The dependent variable is
the cumulative abnormal return. RCHANGE is the absolute value of rating change in notches; IGRADE
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the rating downgrade crosses the investment grade boundary, and 0
otherwise; DAYS is the log of the number of days since the last rating change (downgrades as well as
upgrades); WATCHLIST is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the rating change follows a watchlist placement,
and 0 otherwise; SIZE is calculated as log book value of total assets (Compustat item #6); LEVERAGE
is calculated as total debt (#9 + #34)/(total debt (#9 + #34) + market value of equity (#199)); ¯nally
CASHFLOW is calculated as earnings before depreciation (#18) / book value of total assets (#6). ***,
**, and * indicate signi¯cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. t-values are given in parenthesis.
explanatory variables OLS IV
INTERCEPT 0 -0.030***
(0.03) (-2.80)
RCHANGE -0.031*** -0.0256***
(-7.21) (-7.43)
IGRADE -0.007 0.007
(-0.38) (0.75)
DAYS 0.004*** 0.002***
(3.52) (2.86)
WATCHLIST 0.064***
(2.90)
WATCHLIST*RCHANGE 0.013***
(2.80)
WATCHLIST*IGRADE -0.002
(-0.07)
WATCHLIST*DAYS -0.002
(-1.18)
SIZE 0.001
(0.84)
LEVERAGE -0.041***
(-3.01)
CASHFLOW 0.075***
(3.58)
year dummies yes
Adj:R2(%) 6.12 4.86
F 7.24*** 17.79***
method OLS IV
observations 2353 2142
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